Who am I?

About Me

Taner GüngörI’m a Senior Software Engineer with a strong focus on software architecture, designing secure and scalable systems across automotive, embedded, banking and energy domains.

I studied Computer Engineering at Izmir University of Economics on a scholarship, working in parallel as a freelance web developer for Netsis for three years. After graduating, I joined Accenture, where I spent almost 1.5 years developing a correspondent banking application for İşbank, one of Turkey’s largest banks.

Wanting to work on harder problems in AI, machine vision and robotics, I earned an Erasmus Mundus scholarship for the master’s programme in Vision and Robotics at the University of Burgundy, the University of Girona and Heriot-Watt University.

I then moved into automotive. At ADASENS Automotive, a FICOSA subsidiary, I designed and implemented an online calibration algorithm for rear-view camera systems, granted as a patent in Europe, the US, Japan and China, and used in the 2019 Audi e-tron. At APTIV I designed and developed behaviour estimation and trajectory planning software for the Level 3 Highway Pilot system of the 2021 BMW iX.

As team lead at Dekimo, I led an embedded software team, standardised our development processes and mentored engineers, while consulting on Rambus‘ Root of Trust RT-130 with a focus on code safety, security and reliability.

Today at Volue, a technology leader in the green energy transition, I lead technical discussions, design secure client-server communication (TLS on RMI with a custom CA chain), integrate APIs, and document architectures for scalable, maintainable systems.

Languages: C, C++, Python, Java, SQL
Computer Vision: OpenCV, ROS, TensorFlow
Embedded & Safety: MISRA C/C++, Coverity, ARM Cortex-M, Automotive SPICE
Cloud & IoT: AWS, Google Cloud, Docker, Raspberry Pi, Arduino
AI-Assisted Development: Claude, GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT, MCP
Tools & Practices: Git, Jenkins, Enterprise Architect (UML), GoogleTest, CI/CD, TDD, Agile/Scrum

Industries: Automotive, Energy, Semiconductor, Banking & Finance, Automation

Thoughts, guides and lessons learned

Blog

Articles on automotive software, computer vision, software architecture, security, hacking and AI, written from hands-on industry experience.

Close-up of a glowing blue and black digital globe

Conficker: The Botnet Nobody Could Hijack

In Part 1 of this series, Coreflood lost its botnet because its bots obeyed whoever answered at the controller’s address. The FBI redirected 29 domains, and the bots took orders from a court-appointed server.

Conficker, which appeared in November 2008, made none of those mistakes. Its updates were signed with an RSA key that only its authors held. Its rendezvous domains changed every day, and one variant generated 50,000 of them daily across more than 100 top-level domains. Later versions also talked to each other directly, peer to peer. Nobody could send Conficker a stop command.

Fiber optic cables connected to a network switch in a server rack

Coreflood Under the Hood: The Botnet That Forgot to Lock Its Front Door

In my post on active defense versus hacking back, Coreflood got one paragraph. In April 2011 the US Justice Department took over the botnet’s command servers and told the infected computers to stop. That paragraph is accurate, but it skips the part I find most interesting as an engineer.

The takeover was possible because of design decisions the authors made years earlier. Coreflood trusted whatever server answered at its addresses, and it obeyed commands without checking who sent them. In other words, it forgot to lock its front door.

Two white indoor delivery robots parked in a hotel alcove

Service Robots Are Learning to Drive: Lessons from Autonomous Vehicles

A robotaxi changes lanes to avoid a double-parked truck while a passenger asks it to play 80s hip-hop and wants to know when the Giants game starts. That scene opens Jochen Wirtz’s article on generative AI robots in Harvard Business Review, which I read in HBR Türkiye’s June 2026 issue. Wirtz, a long-time researcher on service robots, argues that generative AI will finally make robots useful in hotels, hospitals, restaurants and shops: places where service has always depended on people.

I have spent years teaching cameras to understand the world around a car, so the Waymo opening caught my attention for a different reason. Autonomous driving is the one field where robots already move among the public at scale, and it has spent fifteen years learning, often the hard way, what it takes to make that safe. Service robots are about to go through the same lessons. This post summarises Wirtz’s article and then looks at it through that lens.

Close-up of a developer typing code on a laptop in a dark room

Agentic AI: Faster Startups, Fragile Systems

A two-person startup that ships a new release every two weeks, closes its funding round in ten months and lets AI agents handle onboarding, legal review and customer support. That is the picture of the new startup that Vivian S. Lee, Linda Mantia and Jon McNeill paint in a Harvard Business Review article that I read in HBR Türkiye’s July–August 2026 issue. Their argument: agentic AI is the biggest change in how companies are built since the internet, and established companies are structurally badly placed to respond.

I think a large part of that argument is right. But reading it as an engineer, I kept noticing what is missing: the failures, the independent numbers and almost everything about security. This post summarises the article and then fills in those gaps.

Laptop on a round table showing a padlock icon over a world map

Cloud and API Security: The Small Mistakes Behind Big Breaches

Most cloud breaches I read about do not start with a brilliant zero-day. They start with something small and boring: a role that collected one permission too many, an API nobody remembered to switch off, a token that outlived the job it was created for. Each mistake looks harmless on its own. The damage comes when two or three of them line up.

In October 2025, Harvard Business Review Türkiye published an article by Can Polat that makes exactly this argument. He says cloud and API security should be treated as a systemic problem, not a list of individual holes, and he describes a set of “advanced patterns” that classic controls tend to miss. I like the framework. My one criticism is that every scenario in the article is illustrative: no real incident, no source. So in this post I keep his structure and attach each pattern to a breach that actually happened and was publicly investigated.